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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”1  From Benjamin 
Cardozo’s early expression of the principle of patient autonomy emerged 
the doctrine of informed consent, defined by both contract and fiduciary 
laws and elaborated upon by courts, state and federal legislatures, and 
professional associations.  Later, as the world sought to reassemble itself 
following the horrors of World War II, the promulgation of the Nuremberg 
Code established an international standard for the treatment of human 
research subjects.2  The experiences of the Nazi atrocities, together with 
America’s own unfortunate history in human experimentation, provided 
informal precedent for the courts in their interpretation of informed 
consent requirements.3  
                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005. 
1 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).  
2 See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181-82 (1949), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/nuremberg.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2004) 
[hereinafter NUREMBERG CODE].  The Nuremberg Code uses natural law to describe a 
broad theory of human rights.   
3 See Larry I. Palmer, Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of 
Medicine: Genetic Health and Eugenics Precedents: A Voice of Caution, 30 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 237, 257 (2003).  Palmer discusses the unique impact of the Nazi doctors’ trials 
at Nuremberg and the Tuskegee syphilis experiments on American courts.  See id. at 258-
61.  Although not formally binding precedents, the philosophical and moral lessons from 
these “eugenics precedents” are often referenced in human experimentation cases.  See 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XI, Issue 1 
[2]  The courts, federal statutory requirements, and international 
agreements draw on these unfortunate episodes in efforts to protect the 
autonomy and well-being of human subjects.  The ethical requirements 
governing medical practitioners further supplement these protections.4  
Today, with the decoding of the human genome and recent explosive 
growth in biotechnology research, medicine and the profit-motive intersect 
as never before.5  The resulting leaps in technological advancement and 
quality of care are remarkable, but the impact on human subjects research, 
especially the vulnerable populations that participate in such studies, raises 
serious ethical questions.  The doctrine of informed consent requires 
thorough reevaluation, both in the therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
contexts, particularly where the disclosure of financial conflicts of interest 
is concerned.6  
 
                                                                                                                         
generally George J. Annas, Mengele’s Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States 
Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 17 (1991) (discussing the United States’ 
ambivalence towards human experimentation).  
4 See generally CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS  WITH ANNOTATIONS 
(Am. Med. Ass’n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 2002), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8288.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2003) 
[hereinafter CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS]. 
5 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Financial Conflict of Interest in 
Medical Research: Overview and Analysis of Federal and State Controls, 57 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 445, 446-47 (2002) (“Each [financial conflict of interest] regulation differs in 
its focus and definition of what constitutes a financial conflict, thus creating a patchwork 
of regulations—some designed to protect the integrity of research results and others 
designed for the safety of human research participants.”).    
6 See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 812 n.2 (Md. 2001).  The 
Grimes court offers a concise distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
research:  
     [a]t least to the extent that commercial profit 
motives are not implicated, therapeutic research’s 
purpose is to directly help or aid a patient who is 
suffering from a health condition the objectives of the 
research are designed to address—hopefully by the 
alleviation, or potential alleviation, of the health 
condition.  
 
     Non-therapeutic research generally utilizes 
subjects who are not known to have the condition the 
objectives of the research are designed to address, 
and/or is not designed to directly benefit the subjects 
utilized in the research, but, rather, is designed to 
achieve beneficial results for the public at large (or, 
under some circumstances, for profit).  
Id.  
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[3]  Observers often point to the unique characteristics of biotechnology 
research as creating a need for higher scrutiny of the informed consent 
process.7  Biotechnology research in academic facilities involves a great 
deal of competition for funding, often from private sources, which creates 
a decidedly more entrepreneurial environment.8   
 
[4]  The result of this commercialization is that research of human subjects 
becomes “laced with more tangible financial conflicts of interest arising at 
multiple points throughout the research process.”9  Additionally, the now 
generally accepted proposition that researchers can obtain patent 
protection for genetic sequences greatly enhances the economic payoff 
and marketability of important discoveries.10  The sophisticated nature of 
both the science itself and of attending financial interests creates special 
concerns when explaining research to subjects, particularly where study 
populations may include indigenous or otherwise specially-situated 
individuals.11  
 
[5]  The diverse roots of the informed consent doctrine, emerging as they 
did in the contexts of both medical treatment and scientific research, have 
fostered a number of ambiguities as each field evolves and changes over 
time.  Strong financial incentives call the objectivity of institutional 
review practices into question,12 and the need for clearly drawn ethical 
principles to govern these practices grows stronger as we move into the 
Human Genome Era.13  
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Karen A. Jordan, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects 
Research: Proposals for a More Effective Regulatory Scheme, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
15, 18 (2003).  
8 See id.  
9 Id.  
10 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 312-13 (1980) (holding that 
living organisms are not per se violations of the product of nature doctrine); Amgen, Inc. 
v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that conception of 
an invention involving a genetic sequence occurs when some level of reduction to 
practice is achieved).  
11 See generally Kara H. Ching, Indigenous Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic 
Patenting: Recognizing an Emerging Human Rights Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 687 
(1997) (discussing how the law may aid indigenous peoples in securing meaningful 
control over their genetic material).  
12 See Henderson & Smith, supra note 5, at 446.  
13 This era is characterized as “a period in which biomedical research will be 
dominated by the assumption that genetic knowledge will improve health care delivery 
and presumably overall health status.”  Larry I. Palmer, Disease Management and 
Liability in the Human Genome Era, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).  In essence, scientific 
progress and experimentation will dominate much of the health care system.  See id. at 2-
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[6]  Complicating these concerns is the distinction created by both courts 
and legislatures between the duties of those engaging in “therapeutic” 
research and those engaging in “non-therapeutic” research.14  Some courts 
maintain that the non-therapeutic context does not trigger a doctor-patient 
style fiduciary relationship, and that researchers owe no duty to disclose 
otherwise relevant financial information in such situations.15  If this trend 
continues to develop, the negative impact on the relationship of trust 
between researchers and subjects will far outweigh any benefits to be 
gained from nondisclosure.  
 
[7]  This article addresses the issues arising from genetic human subjects 
research and recommends that researchers follow stricter requirements for 
the disclosure of financial conflicts of interest.  Part II focuses on 
historical precedents providing a framework for the regulation of human 
subjects research.  Part III lays out the relevant standards for informed 
consent.  Part IV discusses a number of cases with implications for genetic 
research.  Part V analyzes some of the unique characteristics of genetic 
research that raise ethical concerns.  Finally, Part VI proposes stricter 
requirements for the disclosure of financial conflicts of interest during the 
informed consent process.     
 
II. THE NECESSITY OF CONSENT 
 
[8]  In light of the troubling history of human subjects research, a number 
of international agreements and professional edicts have emerged 
discussing the ideal ethical requirements that should govern such 
practices.  American courts make regular reference to these statements, 
                                                                                                                         
3.  Writing before the Greenberg decision was reached, Palmer argued that researchers 
“must . . . disclose, without the plaintiffs’ asking, their intentions regarding the patenting 
of genetic knowledge and other data they obtain.”  Id. at 28. 
 14 See Victoria Orlowski, Note, Promising Protection Through Internationally 
Derived Duties, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 381, 393 (2003) (“The ‘therapeutic/non-
therapeutic’ distinction . . . opens the possibility for deception because it encourages 
[institutional review boards] and researchers to cast their experiments as beneficial in 
some way because subjects are less likely to participate in research which will harm or 
not benefit them.”).   
15 See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that the duty of informed consent does not extend to 
economic interests in a non-therapeutic relationship).  But see Grimes v. Kennedy 
Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 845-46 (Md. 2001) (describing special relationships 
that may exist even in a non-therapeutic context).   
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although the exact nature of the legal obligations they create is, at best, 
unclear.16 
 
[9]  Following the Nazi doctors’ trials, the Nuremberg court echoed 
Cardozo’s early sentiments in its promulgation of the Nuremberg Code, 
declaring that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely 
essential.”17  The Nuremberg court used natural law theory to expand upon 
Cardozo’s insistence on autonomy, emphasizing that subjects must have 
the legal capacity to consent, the right to refuse continuation in any study, 
and a demonstration of knowledge and comprehension of all risks 
associated with participation.18  The Code, although widely accepted and 
relied upon by the international scientific community, met with some 
criticism and resistance, primarily from researchers who felt its 
requirements were too legalistic and impracticable for everyday 
implementation.19 
 
[10]  In response to calls for a more flexible formulation of informed 
consent requirements, the World Medical Association issued the 
Declaration of Helsinki in 1964.20  The Declaration placed the well-being 
of human subjects above “the interests of science and society,”21 and 
called for special protections for vulnerable research populations, 
particularly the “economically and medically disadvantaged.”22 
 
[11]  Many of these principles are reflected in what has come to be known 
as the “Common Rule” governing federally funded human subjects 
                                                 
16 For example, the Nuremberg Code has been cited only once by the Supreme Court, 
in a dissent by Justice O’Connor.  See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  The majority denied relief to a former soldier alleging injury 
following military testing of LSD, finding that the Code’s principles did not apply to the 
military context.  Id. at 686.   
17 NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 181. 
18 Id.  
19 See Orlowski, supra note 14, at 396. 
20 See George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: 
Nuremberg, Helsinki, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 122-23 (1992). 
21 DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MED. RESEARCH 
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS § A.5 (World Med. Ass’n 2002), 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2004) [hereinafter 
DECLARATION OF HELSINKI]. 
 22 Id. § A.8.    
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research in the United States.23  The provisions of the Common Rule are 
scattered throughout the regulations of several agencies and include the 
requirement of institutional review board (“IRB”) approval of protocols 
for the protection of the rights and safety of study participants.24  
 
[12]  The American Medical Association’s (“AMA”) Code of Medical 
Ethics confers decision-making responsibility on the patient.25  Further, it 
requires informed consent before the commercial use of human tissue, 
stressing the fact that financial interests must not influence medical 
decision-making.26  The text of the AMA’s requirements dealing with the 
commercial use of human tissue bears repeating: 
 
The rapid growth of the biotechnology industry has resulted 
in the commercial availability of numerous therapeutic and 
other products developed from human tissue.  Physicians 
contemplating the commercial use of human tissue should 
abide by the following guidelines:  
(1) Informed consent must be obtained from patients for the 
use of organs or tissues in clinical research.  
(2) Potential commercial applications must be disclosed to 
the patient before a profit is realized on products developed 
from biological materials.  
(3) Human tissue and its products may not be used for 
commercial purposes without the informed consent of the 
patient who provided the original cellular material.  
(4) Profits from the commercial use of human tissue and its 
products may be shared with patients, in accordance with 
lawful contractual agreements.  
(5) The diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives offered to 
patients by their physicians should conform to standards of 
good medical practice and should not be influenced in any 
way by the commercial potential of the patient’s tissue.27  
 
 
                                                 
23 See Lori A. Alvino, Note, Who’s Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the 
Erosion of Research Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 898-99 
(2003). 
24 Id. at 898-900.  
25 See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 4, § 10.01.   
26 See id. § 2.08.   
27 Id.  
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III. STANDARDS FOR DISCLOSURE 
 
[13]  From the earliest articulation of the patient’s right of informed 
consent, courts have worked at defining a practicable standard with the 
influence of tort doctrine playing a large role in this evolution.28  Stricter 
formulations of informed consent require the physician to disclose 
information that his patients might consider material to the course of 
treatment, while less rigorous applications of the doctrine utilize a more 
flexible standard requiring compliance with industry norms in the medical 
field.29   
 
[14]  The informed consent doctrine requires general disclosure of the 
diagnosis and possible treatment alternatives, as well as the nature, risks, 
and likelihood of success of a given treatment or procedure.30  In a slight 
majority of jurisdictions, courts rely on the physician-oriented standard to 
determine what information must be disclosed, applying an industry 
practice standard similar to that used for medical negligence generally.31  
Other jurisdictions utilize the more stringent patient-oriented standard.32  
 
[15]  The touchstone for the patient-oriented approach comes from 
Canterbury v. Spence, which assembled a variety of earlier holdings into a 
coherent standard.33  The court held that the appropriate measure of 
disclosure is not what the reasonable physician would consider relevant, 
but what the reasonable patient would want to know before making a 
decision.34  Relying heavily on Cardozo’s opinion in Schloendorff v. 
Society of the New York Hospital, the Canterbury court defined the 
standard of care: 
 
[d]ue care may require a physician perceiving symptoms of 
bodily abnormality to alert the patient to the condition.  It 
may call upon the physician confronting an ailment which 
does not respond to his ministrations to inform the patient 
thereof.  It may command the physician to instruct the 
patient as to any limitations to be presently observed for his 
                                                 
28 See MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 132 
(2d ed. 1999). 
29 See id. at 134-35. 
30 Id. at 133. 
31 Id. at 134.  
32 Id. at 135.  
33 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  
34 See id. at 786-87.  
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own welfare, and as to any precautionary therapy he should 
seek in the future.  It may oblige the physician to advise the 
patient of the need for or desirability of any alternative 
treatment promising greater benefit than that being pursued.  
Just as plainly, due care normally demands that the 
physician warn the patient of any risks to his well-being 
which contemplated therapy may involve.35  
 
[16]  This sentiment was echoed by other jurisdictions.36  Still, the less-
restrictive physician-oriented standard, which limits the informed consent 
requirement “to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner 
would make under the same or similar circumstances,” became 
dominant.37  The application of these two doctrines would trouble courts 
and commentators as new developments in biotechnology and medicine 
brought the worlds of treatment, research, and business closer together.  
 
IV. INFORMED CONSENT IN GENETIC RESEARCH 
 
[17]  There are three important cases that have implications for informed 
consent in genetic research and that discuss both the patient-oriented and 
the physician-oriented standards for disclosure.  These cases provide a 
good picture of the spectrum along which courts lie in their applications of 
the informed consent standards, and show where the courts may go when 
confronted with future disputes arising from genetic research.  
 
[18]  The eugenics precedents discussed above deal primarily with non-
therapeutic research, where no direct benefit is conferred on the subject.  
This contrasts with therapeutic research, where subjects are also 
considered the patients of researchers, engaged in the type of relationship 
envisioned by the Code of Medical Ethics.38  Although some jurisdictions 
maintain that the non-therapeutic context does not trigger a doctor-patient 
style fiduciary relationship,39 this typically is not the approach taken by 
                                                 
35 Id. at 781 (citations omitted).  
36 See, e.g., Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1097-98 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(finding that the defendant’s conduct failed to satisfy the “lay” standard enunciated in 
Canterbury). 
37 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).  
38 See Orlowski, supra note 14, at 393.  Interestingly, the Code of Medical Ethics 
refers to those involved in medical studies as “patients,” whereas the Nuremberg Code 
and most statutes regulating research refer to them as “subjects.”  Compare CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 4, § 2.08, with NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 181.  
39 Supra note 15.   
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medical researchers or their subjects.40  The cases below address situations 
arising from both therapeutic and non-therapeutic types of research, and 
illustrate how the blurred distinction between the two can create confusion 
for researchers and subjects alike.   
 
[19]  Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc. is 
the most recent and perhaps most troubling case on this issue.41  In 
Greenberg, a United States district court in Florida held that a physician 
had no duty to obtain informed consent prior to his commercial use of 
donated tissues while researching the cause of Canavan disease, and 
further, that there was no fiduciary duty requiring disclosure of financial 
conflicts of interest.42  The court reasoned that no therapeutic relationship 
existed between the physician/researcher and his subjects.43  It even went 
so far as to conclude that the plaintiffs were more akin to donors, or even 
co-researchers, than research subjects per se.44 
 
[20]  The individual plaintiffs in Greenberg were parents of children with 
Canavan disease.  Canavan disease interferes with brain fiber growth in 
children of Ashkenazi or Eastern European Jewish descent; it is usually 
fatal.45  In 1987, plaintiff Daniel Greenberg approached Dr. Rueben 
Matalon requesting help in the search for the genetic cause of the disease 
and the development of a prenatal screening test to identify potential 
carriers.46  Greenberg and one of the organizational plaintiffs, the Chicago 
Chapter of the National Tay-Sachs and Allied Disease Association, Inc., 
sought out other Canavan families to provide tissue (such as blood, urine, 
and autopsy samples), health histories, and financial support.47  The 
plaintiffs alleged an understanding that any results from the research 
would remain in the public domain, on the basis of prior experience in 
community testing for Tay-Sachs disease.48  
 
                                                 
40 See Interview with Jim Evans, M.D., Ph.D, Department of Genetics, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 18, 2004) (on file with 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology) [hereinafter Evans Interview]. 
41 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 
(S.D. Fla. 2003). 
42 Id. at 1070-72.   
43 Id. at 1070.  
44 Id. at 1071. 
45 Palmer, supra note 3, at 261-62.   
46 Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.  
47 Id. at 1067.  
48 Id.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XI, Issue 1 
[21]  Following a breakthrough in 1993, however, Dr. Matalon obtained a 
patent for forty-four claims, including:  
 
nucleic acid sequences, genes, polypeptides, antibodies, 
vectors containing the gene, host cells transformed with 
vectors containing the gene, animal models for the disease, 
methods for expressing the polypeptide, genetic screening 
methods and kits, diagnostic methods and kits, methods of 
treating Canavan disease and methods of genetic therapy 
for the disease.49 
 
[22]  The plaintiffs further alleged that they had no knowledge of the 
patent, or of Matalon’s commercial intentions, until 1998, when Miami 
Children’s Hospital began threatening and imposing royalty fees on health 
providers using the Canavan test.50  The plaintiffs brought suit for six 
claims, including lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, 
unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, conversion, and 
misappropriation of trade secrets.51  The court dismissed with prejudice all 
but the unjust enrichment claim.52 
 
[23]  In dismissing the informed consent claim, the court reasoned that 
imposing such a duty would “chill medical research as . . . [researchers] 
constantly evaluate whether a discloseable event has occurred.”53  It also 
portrayed this “extra duty” as creating “dead-hand control that research 
subjects could hold because they would be able to dictate how medical 
research progresses.”54  The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ contention that 
the Code of Medical Ethics required informed consent prior to commercial 
use of human tissue, finding that its 1994 promulgation occurred too late 
to bind the parties.55 
                                                 
49 U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (issued Oct. 21, 1997).  
50 Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: 
Canavan Decision Favors Researchers over Families, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450, 451 
(2003). 
51 Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1068. 
52 Id. at 1077-78.  
53 Id. at 1070.  
54 Id. at 1071.  
55 Id. at 1071 n.2.  Although the Code of Medical Ethics does not confer a formal 
legal obligation on physicians, its provisions are often used to establish the standard of 
due care in the medical industry in tort claims.  See, e.g., Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 
371, 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that “[w]e are not the first court to recognize that 
the Code of Medical Ethics sets forth the medical profession’s standard on informed 
consent”).  
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[24]  The holding of the Greenberg court has dangerous ethical 
implications and creates opportunities for the exploitation of vulnerable 
study populations.  Fortunately, alternative approaches taken by other 
jurisdictions provide more effective and ethical protections of patient 
autonomy, while simultaneously taking into account the interests of 
scientific progress.   
 
[25]  For example, in the widely-discussed case of Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California, the Supreme Court of California held that: 
 
(1) a physician must disclose personal interests 
unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or 
economic, that may affect the physician’s 
professional judgment; and  
 
(2) a physician’s failure to disclose such interests 
may give rise to a cause of action for performing 
medical procedures without informed consent or 
breach of fiduciary duty.56 
 
[26]  In reaching this decision, the court relied on California’s patient-
oriented standard of disclosure,57 and took the standard even further by 
recognizing that a reasonable patient would wish to be informed of 
potential profit motives or economic incentives.58  
 
[27]  The plaintiff in Moore was diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia in 
1976 by defendant Golde, a physician at UCLA Medical Center.59  The 
complaint alleged that at the time of the diagnosis, the defendants “were 
aware that ‘certain blood products and blood components were of great 
                                                 
56 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).  The court 
upheld the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the count of conversion, providing the other 
significant wing of the Moore decision.  See id. at 480.  
57 See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1972) (holding that the scope of 
communications must be determined by materiality with respect to the patient’s needs).  
58 Moore, 793 P.2d at 483 (citing Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Med. 
Exam’rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)).  Concerns over the influence of 
financial considerations on medical decision-making have created a wealth of literature, 
particularly in the context of the managed care industry.  See generally, e.g., Mark A. 
Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 693 (1994) (arguing 
“for lifting the ethical taboo against physician bedside rationing”). 
59 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.  
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value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts.’”60  Golde, who 
determined that Moore’s life was threatened by the condition, obtained 
consent to remove Moore’s spleen in 1976.61  From this time until 1983, 
Moore made several trips to UCLA Medical Center at Golde’s direction, 
where Golde drew samples of “‘blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow 
aspirate, and sperm.’”62  Moore alleged that he did so based upon Golde’s 
representations that such samples were necessary for his continued 
medical treatment and “‘the trust inherent in and by virtue of the 
physician-patient relationship.’”63 
 
[28]  Unbeknownst to Moore, Golde established a cell-line from Moore’s 
T-lymphocytes,64 and obtained a patent for twenty-two claims, including 
the cell line and numerous procedures for the production of bone marrow 
proteins.65  Based upon biotechnology industry reports, Moore alleged that 
the potential market for such procedures exceeded three billion dollars.66 
 
[29]  Moore involved a clear case of a therapeutic, doctor/patient 
relationship, and is thus distinguishable from the situation in Greenberg.  
At least this was the rationale employed by the Greenberg court in its 
ruling.67  Drawing this distinction too finely, however, invites troubling 
behavior if the IRBs charged with protecting patient safety misunderstand 
or misinterpret requirements, as was the case in Grimes v. Kennedy 
Krieger Institute, Inc.68 
 
[30]  Grimes arose outside the field of genetic research, but its facts make 
concerns over the mishandling of the therapeutic/non-therapeutic 
distinction all the more clear.  The Kennedy Krieger Institute (“Institute”), 
associated with Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, initiated a non-
therapeutic research project studying the relative efficacy of various levels 
                                                 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 480-81.  As explained by the court, T-lymphocytes are white blood cells that 
produce regulatory proteins essential to the immune system.  Id. at 482 n.2.  Moore’s T-
lymphocytes overproduced certain proteins, or lymphokines, making it easier to identify 
the corresponding genetic code responsible for their production.  Id.  
65 Id. at 482; see U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (issued Mar. 20, 1984). 
66 Moore, 793 P.2d at 482. 
67 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 
1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
68 See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 813-14 (Md. 2001). 
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of lead abatement in residential homes.69  The Institute arranged with a 
local non-profit corporation administering low-income housing and a 
group of landlords to effect partial lead abatement modifications in certain 
homes, and to give priority to families with young, healthy children.70  
Over a two-year period, the study would measure the levels of lead dust 
present in the homes, as well as the levels of lead contamination present in 
the (previously) healthy children residing there.71  Prior studies had 
already indicated that lead dust would remain in the houses over a period 
of time.72 
 
[31]  The court likened the children used in the study to “canaries in the 
mines,” and determined that there had been no adequate explanation 
during the consent process of how the lead dust in the homes related to 
either the lead abatement modifications or to the actual lead contamination 
in the children’s blood.73  It further suggested that the IRB actually tried to 
assist researchers in avoiding stringent federal regulations governing non-
therapeutic research on children by rephrasing its description of possible 
benefits to the control group, and that the IRB failed to grasp the 
distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research.74 
 
[32]  In finding a special relationship between the researchers and their 
subjects, the Grimes court relied on eugenics precedents such as the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the Nazi doctors’ trials, as well as 
experiments conducted on prisoners, soldiers, and charity hospital 
patients.75  Drawing on these experiences, it similarly characterized low-
income children as a vulnerable research population, due to their youth 
and their poverty.76  From this analysis, and specifically referencing the 
Nuremberg Code, the court held that the informed consent research 
agreements can act as contracts, or may create “special relationships” from 
                                                 
69 Id. at 811-12.   
70 Id. at 812. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 813.  
74 See id. at 813-14.  Federal regulations include special protections for children, 
pregnant women, fetuses, and prisoners involved in medical research.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 
46.201(a), 46.301(a), 46.401(a) (2003).  The regulations make it extraordinarily difficult 
to conduct research involving greater than minimal risk of harm with no potential for 
benefit where children are involved.  See 45 C.F.R. § 46.404 (2003). 
75 See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 816-17. 
76 Id. at 817. 
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which duties arise.77  It further held that “normally, such special 
relationships are created between researchers and the human subjects used 
by the researchers.”78 
 
[33]  In dicta, the court engaged in a lengthy discussion of financial 
conflicts of interest, but it eventually declared that the record did not 
sufficiently indicate the extent to which commercial interests may have 
interfered with the Institute’s research interests, and what effect these 
interests might have had on the researchers’ motivations.79  The court 
worried, however, that potentially commercialized research involving 
vulnerable subjects might place obstacles between the researchers’ goals 
and the health of the subjects, thus creating a need for “full and continuous 
disclosure” of conflicts.80  
 
V. GENETIC SCIENCE AND HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
[34]  The exploding market for biotechnology-related products creates 
large financial incentives for researchers working with human populations 
in the genetic science field.  The disclosure of potential conflicts between 
research and commercial interests, and protection of the informed consent 
process generally, is often difficult because of frequent utilization of what 
one scholar refers to as “[t]he [q]uestionable [d]emographics of [m]edical 
[r]esearch.”81  Populations studied often include low-income or ethnic 
minority groups.  Thus, the eugenics precedents are commonly cited as 
parallels to modern genetic research, in terms of subject characteristics.82  
Discovery of these potential conflicts may be further complicated by the 
fact that genetic material of interest to researchers is frequently found in 
discrete or isolated indigenous populations.83 
 
[35]  A number of recent incidents illustrate these “questionable 
demographics” in the field of cell line research, which authors frequently 
use to emphasize divergence between the cultural beliefs and social 
institutions of indigenous societies and the profit-seeking, “industrialized 
intellectual property systems.”84  For example, a patent submission on the 
                                                 
77 Id. at 857-58.  
78 Id. at 858.    
79 Id. at 840. 
80 Id. at 850-51. 
81 Orlowski, supra note 14, at 394-95. 
82 See id. at 395-96. 
83 See Ching, supra note 11, at 687. 
84 Id. at 700.  
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cell line of a member of the Guaymi people in Panama was protested by a 
tribal leader as being “contrary to the Guaymi view of nature, and our 
place in it.”85  The tribe was not informed of the patent, nor of the 
establishment of a cell line, until the patent application was found by a 
rural development non-profit organization, who then contacted members 
of the tribe.86  
 
[36]  Other recent examples of controversial research on indigenous 
populations include that on residents of the Solomon Islands and the 
Hagahai tribe of Papua New Guinea.87  Due to cultural differences, it is 
not always easy for researchers to understand how risks and benefits might 
factor into the decision-making matrices of indigenous populations; the 
application of Western conceptions of the “reasonable patient” or the 
“reasonable physician” may be even more difficult. 
 
[37]  The Declaration of Helsinki took particular notice of what it deemed 
“vulnerable” research populations, including not only unsophisticated or 
uneducated populations, but also those that are economically 
disadvantaged. 88  It is with regard to these populations that researchers 
must tread most carefully, for in the absence of full disclosure, the risk of 
exploitation or mistreatment runs the highest.  Even the mildest risk of 
harm can be amplified if researchers fail to satisfactorily explain all 
relevant dangers.89  
 
VI. DEFINING A NEW STANDARD FOR THE HUMAN GENOME ERA 
 
[38]  A commonly referenced tension surrounding legal requirements of 
informed consent and the medical realities facing practitioners is that 
between the principles of autonomy and beneficence.90  Informed consent 
is rooted in autonomy.  As reflected in Cardozo’s statement in 
Schloendorff, the doctrine seeks to place as much relevant information as 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 700-01. 
88 DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 21, § A.8.  
89 See Associated Press, Study: Low “Health Literacy” Widespread, 
http://www.allhealthnews.net/news.html?view=4990 (Apr. 9, 2004) (discussing a recent 
study conducted by the Institute of Medicine, which found that nearly ninety-million 
adults have “limited health literacy,” and that this often leads to increased risks and 
generally less healthy lifestyles as a result of their failure to grasp even the most 
fundamental procedures relating to their treatments). 
90 HALL, supra note 28, at 131-32.  
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possible in the hands of the decision-maker:  the patient.91  This goal 
conflicts, however, with the principle of beneficence, which is the idea 
that doctors are experts trained in the field who seek to provide their 
patients with the best possible care, and who will use their judgment and 
expertise to do so.92  Some limitation of patient autonomy might be 
necessary, for example, if the physician believes the patient’s best interests 
are at stake.93  To this extent, the law recognizes some compromises in the 
ideals of informed consent, allowing for implied or bundled consent in 
certain scenarios, or by the substitution of an objective reasonable person 
standard to satisfy the tort elements of causation and materiality of risk, 
rather than a subjective individual patient standard.94  The instances, 
however, are few and far between, and are not likely to be the case during 
the course of a genetic research program, particularly when a researcher is 
contemplating the disclosure of financial conflicts.  
 
[39]  Although many jurisdictions utilize strict standards for human 
subjects research, and many IRBs apply closer scrutiny to research 
protocols than the law requires, the goal of patient autonomy is best 
fulfilled by a rigorous application of the informed consent principles. 95  A 
strict standard for the disclosure of financial conflicts of interest, without 
respect to the distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
research, is fundamental to the achievement of the goals of the informed 
consent doctrine.  The disclosure requirements found in the Code of 
                                                 
91 See id. at 131.  
92 See id. at 323.  
93 See id.  This might occur, for example, when a patient is deemed too emotionally 
unstable to cope with a full disclosure of his present diagnosis.  
94 See Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 
553-54 (1997).  Implied and bundled consent occurs where a patient is said to have 
consented to a number of different treatments or procedures by consenting to participate 
generally.  Id. at 553.  For example, consent to have one’s blood drawn entails consent to 
physical touching, as well as to disposal of the blood itself.   
95 The University of North Carolina School of Medicine IRB has rigorous disclosure 
standards for physicians participating in medical experiments, particularly where 
financial conflicts are concerned.  For example, an annual reporting of potential conflicts, 
including sponsor compensation arrangements, licensing opportunities, and research 
funding applications is required for each project in which the researcher is involved.  See 
POLICY ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND COMMITMENT (Univ. of N.C. 2004), 
http://www.unc.edu/campus/policies/coi.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2004); INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR SUBMITTING IRB APPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH THAT INCLUDES THE COLLECTION 
OF HUMAN BIOLOGIC SPECIMENS (Univ. of N.C.), 
http://research.unc.edu/ohre/forms_new/Consent/Biomedical/CFsampad.doc (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2004). 
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Medical Ethics that govern researchers who anticipate commercial use of 
human tissue come much closer to achieving these goals.96  
 
[40]  Additionally, the “full and continuous disclosure” of conflicts 
discussed in Grimes greatly contributes to these ideals. 97  More complete 
disclosure reinforces the idea of patient autonomy in decision-making, and 
it further protects against exploitation of vulnerable subjects or any 
increased risk of harm arising from a potential financial conflict of 
interest.98  
 
[41]  In addition, the Common Rule already requires the disclosure of any 
risks or benefits which may apply to the subject or to third parties.99  A 
potential fortune a physician or his financial backers stand to make seems 
to fall within the scope of this requirement. 
 
[42]  Within the medical profession, there is little reason to think that 
physician-researchers distinguish between therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
work; they also do not consider the duties owed to subjects to be 
significantly different between the two contexts.100  With reference to the 
Hippocratic principles governing such relationships, the idea that a 
researcher operating in a non-therapeutic context “cannot do harm to 
people, and cannot be influenced by [financial] conflicts is silly.”101 
 
[43]  The difference between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research is 
not self-evident; it is perhaps even counter-intuitive.  As mentioned, the 
Grimes court determined that the Johns Hopkins IRB itself failed to grasp 
                                                 
96 The National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee, which provided 
recommendations to the Department of Health and Human Services and the Office for 
Human Research Protections, supports disclosure of potential financial conflicts of 
interest during the consent process.  See FIN. RELATIONSHIPS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH: 
ISSUES FOR INSTS., CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND IRBS TO CONSIDER WHEN DEALING 
WITH ISSUES OF FIN. INTERESTS AND HUMAN SUBJECT PROT. § 5.3 (Nat’l Human 
Research Prots. Advisory Comm. 2001),  
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/nhrpac/mtg12-00/finguid.htm (last updated Jan. 13, 2003).  In 
addition, it recommends that IRBs and researchers work very closely to identify and 
manage these conflicts.  See, e.g., id. §§ 1.2, 2.2.    
97 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 851 (Md. 2001). 
98 See Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects Research: The 
Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327, 355 (2003). 
99 Alvino, supra note 23, at 901. 
100 See Evans Interview, supra note 40. 
101 Id.  
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the distinction.102  If the IRB at a sophisticated research institution has 
difficulty distinguishing between the two, clearly a less sophisticated 
patient/subject might also misunderstand the distinction.103  For the 
purpose of disclosure, courts should not hold researchers in the non-
therapeutic context to a less-stringent standard of care; such an approach 
does not accurately reflect the expectations of patients or subjects—
however they are characterized—nor does it do justice to the ethical 
principles governing the medical profession.  
 
[44]  As genetic research becomes increasingly commercialized and 
profit-driven, and if the Greenberg court’s limitation on the scope of 
disclosure in the non-therapeutic context is followed, the danger of harm 
to human research subjects via undisclosed financial influence on medical 
decisions is significant.  This kind of harm is to be taken as seriously and 
is to be avoided as conscientiously as the risk of physical injury, 
particularly if the ethical goals of preserving patient autonomy and 
fostering an atmosphere of trust between researchers and subjects is to be 
realized.104  
 
[45]  The Greenberg court’s warnings of a chilling effect on research 
certainly should be considered, but not at the expense of the trust inherent 
in the relationship between doctors and patients, or between researchers 
and subjects.105  Indeed, the “chilling” that may occur in a regime of tight-
lipped, profit-seeking researchers may be on the willingness of subjects to 
enroll in such studies, greatly hampering technological progress.  The 
interests of science in general, and genetic research in particular, can only 
benefit by the cultivation of this trust through the free, full, and continuous 
disclosure of potential financial conflicts of interest.  
                                                 
102 See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 814.   
103 See Orlowski, supra note 14, at 394.  
104 See Evans Interview, supra note 40. 
105 See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003).   
